Background
In collaboration with Small Arms Survey (SAS), the UNDP Regional Project “Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development Approach” undertakes a Southern Libya Cross Border Assessment on how SALW fuels Violent Extremism in Nigeria within north western Nigeria and Republic of Niger frontiers.
Nigeria is affected by violent extremism, and violent conflicts, ranging from terrorist acts of Boko-Haram and the Islamic Province of West Africa Province (ISWAP) in Nigeria’s northeast (epic centre), to the protracted inter – group violent conflicts in the north western geo-political zone, and between farmers and herders communities in the north-central geo-political zone, and exacerbated by criminal activities of kidnapping for ransom, armed robbery, banditry and indiscriminate cattle rustling, with considerable impact on its sustainable development, consolidation of democracy, viability of the state, and, indeed the corporate existence of the country. Adeyemi1 in his article in business day digital dialogues opined that economic and security challenges ranging from banditry, kidnapping, smuggling, illegal migration and proliferation of light weapons are major issues affecting the country. The relentlessness of the Boko Haram insurgency, for instance, is known to be partly due to the ease with which insurgents from countries in the Lake Chad region easily cross into Nigerian territory, smuggling in arms and ammunition2. Hence, increase on such menace might not be unconnected with the federal government’s decision on closing land borders in 2019.
The north-eastern geo-political zone of Nigeria has emerged as the epicentre of violent extremism, occasioned by Boko Haram’s (and other associated armed violent groups) fierce destructive pursuit on lives and property; challenged by the Nigerian Armed Forces in partnership with a Multinational Joint Task Force, causing , Boko Haram to loose hold over swathes of land resulting into a shift in tactics of launching sporadic attacks on soft targets.
Notwithstanding the ‘epicentre’ states in the north-east, states in the north-central and north-west regions, are emerging and classified as at-risks state. A community perceptions survey conducted by the UNDP Country Office, Nigeria3 revealed that 9.6% of the population across NW and NC (Kano, Kogi, Kaduna, Plateau, Niger and FCT) knew someone who had joined a violent extremist group, and 4.9% of the population had been approached to join a violent extremist group.
All the ‘emergent’ states, aside from FCT, rank amongst the lowest in the country in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI). Out of 36 states; Kano, Niger, Kaduna, Kogi and Plateau State fall in the bottom half of the ranking (Below 18)4. Unemployment rates5 in Kaduna (58%), Kano (51%), Kogi (43%), Niger (40%) and Plateau (48%) are above the national average of 40%. Mean schooling years in all these states are below the national average of 10 years, with Kano demonstrating the lowest number of mean schooling years at 5.7 years6. In addition to relative poverty of the states compared to the national average, grievances about socio-economic conditions, institutions and security actors are prevalent. Only 20.6% of respondents surveyed across the five states and FCT expressed satisfaction with their level of education, and 22.9% expressed satisfaction with their employment status. Only 22.9% of respondents expressed trust in the national government, whilst trust in the local government and police stood as low as 14.7% and 8.2%, respectively. These findings illustrate the prevalence of grievances (structural push factors) regarding socio-economic conditions, institutions and security agencies, and if juxtaposed against the (attractive pull factors); it becomes a veritable mix of root causes for VE.
Looking at the root causes or ‘drivers’ of VE, it is important to pay attention to ‘tipping point’ factors espoused in the UNDP’s 2017 study7 . The study involved 300 interviews with actual former recruits in the north east, and a striking 71% of interviewees pointed to “government action”, including the killing or arrest of family members or friends, as the incident that prompted them to join an extremist group. In addition to already low levels of trust towards security agencies in the five ‘emergent’ states and FCT, the finding highlights the urgent need to restore and build trust between security agencies and communities as an effective approach to PVE. The finding over half of the respondents in the surveyed communities felt that vigilante action was the most effective means of preventing and countering violent extremism, marked the level of trust deficit between state security actors and members of the community, therefore, emphasized the imperatives grassroots (community policing), policing and the need for recognition of non-state security actors in security sector reform. However, a key challenge in engaging with community-based vigilante groups remains preventing abuses of power, human rights violations and ensuring accountability.
The drivers of VE Nigeria are complex and inter-related. Arguably, in the north west region, the security crisis derives from protracted struggle for and acquisition of economic resources (land and water) between predominantly Fulani herders and mainly Hausa farmers, both of whom have over time mobilised armed groups for protection8; occasioning banditry, armed robbery and kidnapping for ransom. According to the International Crisis Group report, this is believed to have been aggravated by flourishing trade of small arms and light weapons in the country paving way for the influence of jihadist and non-jihadist groups. The report noted, a poorly secured international boundary, enables the influx of arms and facilitates the movement of jihadists to and from the Sahel, where the Islamic State has been expanding its influence.
Part of the solutions to ending VE in Nigeria, particularly, north western region as posited by International Crisis Group report requires a multi-pronged approach, some of which must necessarily focus on the long term. According to the report, foremost priority is to encourage negotiated settlements between herders and farmers, as well as to disarm, rehabilitate and reintegrate members of armed groups from either the herders or the farmers; prioritise reforming livestock production systems in a manner that addresses the needs of both herders and farmers, which, ultimately, will reduce struggle for economic resources . Further, and of equal importance, the governments of Nigeria and Republic of Niger should work together to improve border security to stem the flow of jihadists and weapons into the Nigeria, particularly, in the north western region.
According to Jadesola Tai Babatola in a seminar paper10, there are over 1,400 illegal routes into Nigeria, against the 84 approved and regular border control posts in Nigeria with a total and border coverage of 4,047km. From a total of 1,316 irregular routes; smuggling of fast consumers goods, adulterated and contraband goods, used vehicles, trafficking in persons, and small arms and light weapons, and tax evasion in cross-border movements across Nigeria-Niger border reinforces black market features of border economic activities, interaction patterns in the border regions and flouting of international laws and convention, on border crossing to the detriment of the national interest and invariably the national security in that era11. Consequently, peace and security increasingly become elusive while all the development efforts and gains are being eroded owing to the porosity of the Nigerian borders that leads to proliferation of illegal arms and insurgencies in the country. Quoting arms trade expert, William M. Hartung12; Jadesola Tai Babatola pointed out that, conflicts in Africa have attracted arms deal and influx of arms to different parts of north, west and central Africa that have proximity with Nigeria. Hence, in linking the flourishing arms market in Africa to the strengthening of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria as a challenge of the nation’s territorial integrity and national security, he admitted that the proliferation of arms has become a matter of concern owing to the facts that subsist thus: “It’s one conflict after another...because of the nature of the conflict … the concentration of conflicts … the black market in Central Africa is more vibrant than other places”.
The situation of Nigeria’s porous borders, which serve as conduits for illicit transnational traffic of small arms and light weapons and drugs, is further exacerbated by limited presence of security and law enforcement officials. If they are present, they are poorly equipped, poorly paid, poorly trained and sometimes compromised or recruited to do the bid of the insurgents. It was also widely reported on accounts of current and former U.S. officials and arms experts that most of Boko Haram weapons were either stolen from Nigerian military stocks or purchased from thriving Central African arms black market, owing to the insurgents’ source of weaponry, its sophistication and sheer number. Furthermore, it been argued and documented that the degree of arms proliferation and possession of arms and ammunition: surface-to-air missiles, anti-tank missiles, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), AK-47 assault rifles etc by rebel forces and mercenaries during Libya uprising open to acquisition by terrorist groups like Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and sold to Boko Haram and its splinter groups in Nigeria have made the matter worse. Remarkably, a Cameroon Defence Ministry official also noted that a variety of weapons including Russian-made AK-47s, which are used for combats by the Boko Haram as evidence of makeshift collection of small arms, automatic weapons, rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars were cited and suggested to have been procure from nearby conflict zones of Libya and Chad.
VE and the proliferation of SALW has thus become a challenge to Nigeria and her neighbours and looms large as it evolves into the new frontier of the global war of terrorism against civilisation, way of life, and against the many prospects of stability in our region. The spread, and threats of spread; with attendant carnage of VE has risen in proportion to the proliferation of arms and ammunition trafficked from Libya and beyond into the region. Camels, donkeys, cattle, trucks, trailers and petrol tankers that ply the porous borders of the expansive areas that make up northern Nigeria are used to smuggle these arms.
Duties and Responsibilities
- OBJECTIVES
The overall objective of the consultancy is to provide for data collection for a cross-border assessment of violent extremism (VE) relevant for travel and traffic of SALW to/from Southern Libya. Data collection will feed into a wider, regional-level assessment of violent extremism in the borderlands of Northern Niger, Chad and Sudan and will have an outlook to impact of (trade) routes with Nigeria. The data collector will operate in a team of multiple data collecting agencies all providing data to the regional study through a streamlined methodology.
SCOPE OF STUDY
The target geographical coverage of the study is Sokoto and Kebbi states in the north western frontier of Nigeria’s border with the Republic of Niger. Nigeria’s border with Dosso, Tahoua and Maradi in the Republic of Niger18.Specifically, the areas include:
Sokoto
- Illela Control Post,
- Tangaza Control Post,
- Gudu Unit Post,
- Gada Control Post,
- Sabon Birni Control Post (with three patrol base units).
Kebbi
- Kamba Control Post
- Kangiwa Control Post,
- Dole Kaina Control Post,
- Yauri Control Post.
Dosso
- Dan Kassari Control post
- Tounouga, Control post
- Yellou, Control post
- Bengou, Control post
- Bana, Control post
- Doumega, Control post
- Tsibiri. Control post
Tahoua/Maradi
- Konni, Control post
- Bazga, Control post
- Tsernawa, Control post
- Sabon guida, Control post
- Bangui, Control post
- Guidan Roumji Control post
In between the two states, particularly around the enumerated control border post areas, the communities are populated by the Zabarmawa; Arawa; Hausa; Fulani; Dandawa, and Bargawa tribes. A few notable international markets in the area of interest include Kamba (Kebbi State), and Lolo Dolekaina (Kebbi State); others are Illela 1 (Sokoto State), Yarbulutu (Sabon Birni), and Sabon Birni Market (Sokoto State), Niger Republic frontiers with Nigeria.
The consultants will work in a consortium to deliver the specific tasks enumerated below:
- Conduct in-depth research into how SALW fuels VE in Nigeria;
- Conduct desk review of existing relevant literatures on the linkage between SALW and VE in Nigeria, in order to support the selection of community case studies for data collection on the Niger-Nigeria border that are relevant (trade) hubs amongst VE-groups in West and North Africa
- Cooperate with the lead research institute for the regional-level study in the development of the regional methodology, with an eye on the potential to use and/or contextualize it for the Nigerian communities
- To actively participate in regional-level train-the-trainer sessions to assure streamlined data collection and to actively seek mentoring on data collection methods from the lead research institute;
- Distribute research questionnaire to sample population and/or conduct interviews;
- Conduct data entry, review, factcheck/validation and analysis of completed research instruments;
- Prepare preliminary report highlighting initial key findings for UNDP Nigeria
- Prepare draft research report highlighting key findings and recommendations, and submit to UNDP Nigeria
- Prepare final report incorporating inputs from a technical review session with stakeholders.
TARGET PARTICIPANTS / STAKEHOLDERS
For the purpose of conducting the research, it is imperative to consider the following stakeholders/actors in the administration of research instruments for balanced and nuanced responses to questions of linkages between SALW and PVE.
- Heads, state commands and community (Division) level of state security actors;
- Nigeria Police Force,
- Nigeria Customs Service,
- Nigeria Immigrations Service,
- Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps,
- Department of State Security,
- National Drug Law Enforcement Agency,
- Presidential Committee of SALW (PRESCOM)
- Local Government Authority;
- Traditional Rulers;
- Religious and Opinion Leaders;
- Market Heads;
- Business Guilds;
- Head, Transport Union;
- Non- state security actors;
- Women Groups;
- Youth Leader;
- Police Community Relations Committee;
- CSOs/CBOs and FBOs;
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
- Identification and contracting of all resource persons,
- Copies of Policy Framework, and National Action Plan, and National PCVE Strategy,
- 2014 and 2019 National Security Strategy Documents,
- ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms their ammunitions and other materials
- AU Silencing the Guns Agenda by 2020
- Logistics including rooms for Focus Group Discussion, transport etc.
EXPECTED RESULTS/OUTCOMES
The consultants shall produce the following deliverables at the end of the assignment:
- Inception Report/Plan detailing understanding of the terms of the consultancy and workflow and timeline to achieve the specific tasks outlined in this TOR;
- Preliminary report detailing key findings; and recommendations to support CO and Regional PVE and SALW programming;
- Final consultancy report incorporating inputs from the stakeholders after a technical review.
WORKING DOCUMENTS
List of documents to be used during the assignment are as follows:
- National Security Strategy 2014, and 2019,
- UNDP 2018/2019 PVE survey in selected states and FCT, and,
- ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms their ammunitions and other materials
- ECOWAS/EU SALW Project reports
- UNDP concept paper and terms of reference.
METHODOLOGY
- The study shall be guided by an agreed and written research methodology and research instruments between the consultant and UNDP.
WORKING LANGUAGES
- All written materials including research instruments will be conducted in English and translated into vernacular on need basis.
ASSIGNMENT DURATION AND DUTY STATION:
The assignment shall start from the September until December 2020. The research shall be conducted in the north western border frontier with the Republic of Niger (Sokoto, Birnin Kebbi states)
RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS
- DRR-P UNDP CO
- Regional Coordinator, Africa Region SALW Projects
- Project Coordinator CO Niger
- Team Lead, GPS UNDP CO Nigeria.
- National Expert, PVE UNDP CO.
CONDITION OF SERVICE AND TERMS OF PAYMENT:
The consultancy shall be for a period of 4 months starting from September 2020. The consultancy is deliverable based, and the fees shall be paid in three installments and contingent on the deliverables specified against each installment. The milestones shall be paid upon satisfactory acceptance of the deliverables by UNDP. Upon acceptance of the deliverables, UNDP shall issue a Certificate of Satisfactory Performance to the consultant which shall form the basis for the payment of the due milestone.
- 1st Installment (20%); Upon submission of Inception Report/Plan
- 2nd Installment (50%); Upon submission of preliminary report
- 3rd Installment (30%); Upon submission of Final Research Report.
The consultancy fee to be proposed by the consultant(s) shall include Daily Subsistence Allowance (DSA) and travel costs for all official travels associated with the performance of the consultancy.
FUNDING SUPPORT
Funded by and coordinated by UNDP Regional PVE project in collaboration with the Governance
Programme and PVE Project of the Nigeria CO and the Africa SALW Regional projects implemented
from UNDP Nigeria.
Competencies
RESOURCE /COMPETENCES/SKILL SETS
- Identification and contracting of all resource persons/institutes would have lead researcher, assistant researchers, field assistants, data entry and data analyst.
- Communication - Ability to listen, adapt and transform
- Teamwork – Ability to work with others to achieve goals
- Innovation – Ability to make new and useful work
- Delivery – Ability to get things done while executing good job
- Leadership – Ability to persuade others to follow
Required Skills and Experience
QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE:?
- The desired candidate(s) for this assignment shall possess an advanced degree in Social Science, Arts, Sociology, Law and humanities, Dispute Resolution/Peace Studies or other relevant fields for, at least, 10 years.
- He/she must have, at least, 10 years’ research and academic experience with national and international institutions and exposure.
- He/she should have, at least, 5 academic publications to his/her credit excluding academic dissertations
- The candidate must have sound technical and analytic report writing skill and proven ability in academic research and dissertation
- He/she must be fluent in written and spoken English. Previous assignment with UN agencies and/or government is an asset.
SELECTION CRITERIA:
Evaluation Criteria:
- Advanced degree in Social Science, Arts, Sociology, Law and humanities, Dispute Resolution/PeaceStudies or other relevant fields for, at least, 10 years – 15 points
- 10 years’ research and academic experience with national and international institutions andexposure – 15 points
- At least, 5 academic publications to his/her credit excluding academic dissertations – 30 points
- Sound in technical report writing skill and analytic report writing skill and proven ability in academic research and dissertation – 30 points
- Previous working experience with UN agencies or national government is an asset – 10 points